The potential fragility of the F-22 force in any future high intensity conflict is likely very clear to planners, since even the most lethal and survivable fighter is still vulnerable on the ground or if deprived of aerial refuelling tanker support while out of range of friendly runways. The lack of losses in combat to date has not prevented losses through accidents or natural disasters such as Hurricane Michael, which damaged 17 Raptors at Tyndall Air Force Base in 2018. The small fleet and closed production line also make every aircraft lost over time a serious blow to its long-term viability. This leaves a combat coded fleet of around 120, which is an extremely small and niche fleet by US standards, reducing economies of scale and making continued investments harder to justify despite its unmatched combat capabilities. Perhaps most problematic of all for the US Air Force is the fact that F-22 production was repeatedly cut and then finally terminated after only 187 production aircraft in 2011. However, for a US Air Force increasingly focused on the challenge of deterring and potentially fighting China in the Indo-Pacific, this lack of internal range and consequent dependence on vulnerable and easily tracked aerial refuelling tanker orbits is a major weakness.
F-22s based in Alaska and at Guam do regularly fly with external fuel tanks fitted in peacetime, but even jettisoning them in flight does not restore the full stealth characteristics, so in combat this would be a major disadvantage. The ability to detect and engage enemy aircraft with little risk of being detected, or at least tracked and engaged in return, which make the F-22 such a superlative fighter aircraft also prevent it from extending its combat range with external fuel tanks as all traditional fighters regularly do. The F-22 is also relatively short ranged compared to other fighters in its size and weight class such as the older F-15 family, due to its extremely powerful engines and the fact that capacity for internal fuel was sacrificed for internal weapons bays to enable the fighter to carry its armament without compromising its key very low-observable (stealth) attributes.
Furthermore, outdated electronic components and a software and communications architecture designed from the outset to only interface with other F-22s have combined to make the Raptor expensive and complex to upgrade with new weapons and connectivity with other assets such as the F-35. The airframe, stealth coatings and avionics were all pushing the boundaries of technology when they were designed and have meant that the F-22 is extremely expensive to operate and difficult to maintain compared to other fighters. On the other hand, the F-22 has been a problematic asset for the US Air Force for several reasons. The airframe was designed for a fatigue life of 8000 flight hours and the average fatigue rate of the F-22 fleet is currently around 1800 hours, meaning that the jets themselves should have far more potential service life left in them than the much older F-16 and F-15 fleets. Furthermore, it is the second youngest of the US Air Force’s fighter fleets, with production having been undertaken from 19. The F-22 is without question the most lethal and survivable fighter aircraft in operational service anywhere in the world and remains unlikely to be challenged in raw capability terms by any of the latest generation of combat aircraft under development by Russia and China. For many this has come as a profound shock. The Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, General CQ Brown recently outlined his vision for the future of the US Air Force tactical fighter fleets, and it does not include the F-22 Raptor 5th generation stealth fighter.